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I. INTRODUCTION
In the later part of his administration, President Reagan appointed a blue 
ribbon commission on defense management, chaired by Mr. David Packard. In 1986 
this commission published its final report to the President. The work was called A 
Quest fo r  Excellence and was an all inclusive examination of four aspects of the 
Department of the Defense: national security planning and budgeting, military 
organization and command, acquisition organization and procedures, and govemment- 
mdustry accountability. After the recommendations of the report were published, 
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219, issued by President Reagan, 
directed their implementation. This directive was enacted into law by the passage of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 (Public Law 433, 1986).
The Packard Conunission report had a section that addressed acquisition 
organizations and procedures called "An Acquisition Model to Emulate. " The basis of 
the model that "...major savings are possible in the development of weapon systems if 
Department of Defense broadly emulates the acquisition procedures used in 
outstanding programs. To this end, (the Commission) analyzed a number of 
successful programs to identify management features that they had in common, and 
could be incorporated in the defense system. (The Commission) identified six 
underlying features that typified the most successful commercial programs: ’clear 
command channels’, ’stability’, ’limited reporting requirements’, ’small, high quality 
staffs’, ’communication with users’, and ’prototyping and testing’." (Packard 
Commission, 1986).
1
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The purpose of this paper is not to measure the implementation of this model, 
but to determine if these measures are evident in existing programs which are 
considered to be successful. To observe the extent that the characteristics of the 
model are present in existing programs, a survey was sent to two separate Army 
aviation acquisition programs. The programs selected were the CH-47 Cargo 
Helicopter D model upgrade and the Special Operating Forces (SOP) aircraft upgrade 
for the CH-47 aircraft. These acquisitions were selected because both are relatively 
recent and are of the same basic aircraft type. To determine if a program was 
"successful", a subjective analysis was done using performance measures. The 
measures by which each of the procurements were Judged were cost effectiveness and 
the timeliness of the acquisition.
Historically, the press has reported stories of fraud, kickbacks, payoffs, and 
other types of misuse of government funds in defense acquisitions. This enigma in 
defense contracting has cost the tax payers countless dollars. This problem is not new 
and has roots prior to contemporary weapon systems. Before World War I, contracts 
and major weapons acquisitions were localized and generally the same local 
contractors were used. Bidding was not effective and competition was practically non­
existent. In the World War II era, the concept of government procurement was one of 
"damn the costs, there is a war going on". This brought into existence a contract 
known as Cost Plus. Under this agreement, defense contractors submitted a bill to the 
government and charged a percentage of the costs for their profit fee. This contract 
did not lend itself to an efficient use of funds, and did not guarantee that the end
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product would be anywhere near what was promised. These profit percentages, 
although criticized by Congress, were the beginning of the continued criticism of 
defense procurement. This "goldplating" of military hardware by cost plus contracts 
disappeared after World War II, but the emphasis on material first and cost second 
persisted through most of the Cold War era.
During the Kennedy administration, defense contracting reforms were 
instituted. In what is considered a watershed case, Lockheed in 1961, bid not only 
for the research and development of a new generation of transport planes (C-5A cargo 
aircraft) and engines, but also for the actual production of the aircraft. Previously, 
contractors bid for development only and production lots were bid for later. This new 
system arose when attempts were being made to find new types of contracts that 
would tie profits to cost controls.
This system did not work as anticipated. Lockheed managed to run up a multi­
billion dollar cost overrun on the project and it was during this procurement that the 
term "whistle blower" was coined. Cost overruns occurred because no one could 
accurately estimate what the cost would be or should be before the program was 
developed. It was at this point that the confidence of Congress and the public in 
military procurement management was lost (Gregory, 1990).
After this failure, the military tried to award contracts with a "fly before you 
buy" concept (Gregory, 1990). This allowed the military to ascertain if the weapon 
system would perform as advertised. If there was a problem with the scheduling or 
performance requirements, adjustments could be made before new funds were
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allocated to the project.
During Reagan’s administration, defense buildups and restructuring coupled 
with double digit inflation caused more strain on the already faltering relations 
between Congress and the Department of the Defense contracting community. Spare 
parts started to make the headlines with seemingly unreasonably prices attached to 
them. Even though some of the pricing was "justified" through creative accounting by 
using spare parts for the redistribution of overhead and engineering support costs, it 
was difficult to explain the problem away to the public and Congress. It was during 
the later part of his administration that President Reagan appointed the Packard 
Commission to investigate the problems in the defense industry.
In an era of a smaller, more efficient military structure, the dollars that will be 
made available for major systems will decrease. This downsizing has already had 
immediate impact on future acquisitions as well as the current programs. Almost all 
Department of Defense projects are being affected in some way. The B-1 Bomber, 
Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATP), and the nuclear submarine projects are being 
threatened with reduction or cancellation. This suggests that the managers of the 
acquisitions dollars must be more cognizant of where the funds are going and if they 
are being put to their best and most efficient use.
This paper begins with a brief description of the CH-47 aircraft, followed by 
an evaluation of the CH-47 D model upgrade program and the SOF aircraft 
modification program. The next sections will cover the survey and the results. The 
last segment will provide a summary and a conclusion.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE CH-47 AIRCRAFT 
The CH-47 (Cargo Helicopter) medium lift helicopter was designed and 
developed by the Boeing Helicopter Company in the late 1950’s. The contract was a 
result from a design competition conducted by the Air Force on behalf of the Army.
A total of 699 helicopters were delivered, with the airframe being a combat tested 
performer throughout the Vietnam conflict. The CH-47 has undergone several 
modifications throughout it’s production life, from the A model to the current D 
model. Each model, while retaining the basic airframe structure, has a different 
mission capability and Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) 
characteristics. For the purposes of this paper the CH-47 C model aircraft will be 
described as a baseline to compare to the current modifications.
The CH-47C helicopter is the Army’s only tandem rotor, medium lift transport 
helicopter (fig 1). It’s primary missions are the movement of munitions, repair parts, 
petroleum, tactical artillery, troops and special weapons around the battlefield. 
Additional missions include high altitude search and rescue, fire fighting and special 
operations. The "Chinook" helicopter is currently deployed around the world and is 
used by fifteen separate nations (Boeing, 1989).
SPECIFICATIONS:
Max gross weight: 47,000 lbs.. Empty Weight: 23,149 lbs.. Length: 51 ft., Height: 
18 ft. 7.8 in.. Fuel: 1,030 U.S. gallons.
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Figure 1. CH-47 Cargo Helicopter.
PERFORMANCE (at gross weight):
Maximum speed (sea level): 142 knots, Service ceiling: 8,500 ft.. Maximum range: 
229 nm., Rate of climb: 1,100 fpm.. Lift capacity: 23,851 lbs. (Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 1988).
Acquisition History:
In April 1963, the first operational unit was equipped with CH-47 A models. 
CH-47 A’s were deployed to the Republic of Vietnam in July of 1965. In response to 
an urgent requirement developed by the Army in Vietnam, the Army Material 
Command formulated a two step program to improve the capacity, speed, and 
endurance of the A model. In addition to the performance requirements.
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modifications were incorporated to improve the flying qualities to allow full utilization 
of the e?q)anded performance capabilities and to improve reliability, availability, and 
maintainability (RAM).
The first step in the improvement program resulted in the CH-47 B model, first 
delivered in May of 1967. It was identical in size and appearance of the A model, 
with the exception of larger rotor blades. The flight performance was increased due 
to the installation of larger, more advanced engines and the advanced design rotor 
blades.
The CH-47 C model was the third generation aircraft to evolve from the 
improvement program. The size and appearance did not change appreciably, but the 
C model was powered by new engines and a new drive train that was qualified for 
over 6000 shaft horsepower. The fuel capacity was increased to 1129 U.S. gallons 
for the extended range and endurance required by tactical missions.
In 1973, it was realized that the CH-47 fleet was tending towards obsolescence 
with no budgeted research and development dollars for a replacement aircraft. The 
Commandant of the Aviation School request for funding in the 1975 budget included a 
replacement medium lift helicopter. A revised operational capability for modernizing 
the CH-47 fleet was prepared and subsequently approved by the Army in October,
1974 (U.S. Army DARCOM, 1985). This was the beginning of the developmental 
process for the D model currently under production.
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III. ACQUISITION PROGRAM EVALUATIONS 
CH-47 D Model Upgrade:
The CH-47 D model upgrade was a natural extension of the past upgrades to 
the airframe. It was decided that a rebuild of the aircraft would be more cost 
effective than the development of a new aircraft that would take over the operational 
mission of the CH-47. The mission capabilities of the D model were greatly 
improved over that of 
the earlier models of
the Chinook (figure 2). 
The helicopters were 
stripped of all components 
and refitted from the basic 
airframe up. Boeing 
introduced a much larger 
engine and drive train 
system along with new 
fiberglass rotor blades.
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Figure 2. The CH-47 modernization effort 
did make the earlier models of the 
Chinook more reliable, less costly to 
maintain, and much more capable.
There were improvements
in the communications, navigation and flight control systems. In essence, the D 
model was a new aircraft.
The method used in this acquisition was called a Multi-year procurement. This 
is a unique method of acquiring up to five years requirements of a system with a
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single contract. This is a departure from the normal way the Department of Defense 
acquires major systems. Usually the contract is let for a single year’s requirement. 
Generally, the multi-year contract produces two direct benefits. First, it generates a 
cost savings because of less variability in the future budget. Secondly, it promotes 
stability in the requirement, funding, and the design.
The CH-47 D model acquisition seems to be a success story as far as defense 
contracting is concerned. Since the process began in 1976, the contract has been 
ahead of schedule and has been within the budget. Boeing did well enough with the 
production to earn $3.5 million in design to cost incentive fee awards. During the 
engineering development phase, Boeing received a superior performance rating and 98 
percent of the total amount of the incentive fees available (Sutton, 1982).
Cost savings on the program were substantial, especially in light of the 
historical cost overruns of defense procurements. The Army estimates that in the CH- 
47 D model program, it has by 1989 had a cost savings of $47.9 million, or 8.3% 
over the total contract costs of $532.1 million (GAO, 1987).
The release of the aircraft from the plant has been consistently on time or 
ahead of schedule. Boeing had a 40 month schedule but required its functional 
departments to maintain a 36 month timetable, accelerated that schedule and as a 
result, turned out the first prototype that flew four months ahead of the original 
schedule (Sutton, 1982). According to the General Accounting Office, the 
modernization program has been proceeding smoothly and the requirements, funding, 
and design appear to be stable and sufficient to carry out a multi-year contract with
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little risk (GAO, 1987).
Special Operation Forces (SOF) A ircraft Modification;
In May of 1984 a joint Army and Air Force development initiative identified 
the requirements and the responsibilities of the rotary wing Special Operation Forces 
(SOF) operations. This was followed by a joint task force in October of the same 
year that recommended the transfer of the entire SOF rotary wing mission from the 
Air Force to the Army. This action was delayed by the Under Secretary of Defense 
because of the lack of an adequate Army aircraft having the capabilities of the Air 
Force’s HH-53 Pave Low helicopter. In 1986, the Army initiated a modification 
program for CH-47 aircraft. Operationally, these modified aircraft, designated the 
"MH-47", are expected to be able to perform clandestine, deep-penetration airlift 
missions in adverse weather conditions and high-threat environments. Specific 
missions include: counter-terrorism ac*̂ ’cns, infiltration, resupply, extraction, 
interdiction operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations.
In the beginning of the acquisition process, the Army decided that the modified 
aircraft would be considered a non-developmental item and would require no 
operational testing or developmental testing. In its 1989 statement of its SOF 
helicopter acquisition strategy, the Army assumed that because the helicopters used in 
the program were qualified systems, planned testing and evaluation would consist 
primarily of integrating and testing already qualified components (GAO, 1990).
This philosophy changed as the limited testing of already qualified components 
expanded to the complete testing of the entire aircraft system due to the expansion of
10
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
and changes to the program. Currently, developmental testing is concurrent with the 
low rate initial production of 22 of the SOF aircraft. This acquisition approach 
includes a high risk testing strategy in which the Army would not conduct the required 
operational tests before production decisions were made. The Army plans to have 53 
of the 74 aircraft in production or delivered before the operational tests begin and 90 
percent of the production aircraft completed or in production by the time the 
operational testing is completed. In some cases the test aircraft will not have all the 
operational equipment installed prior to the tests (GAO, 1990).
There have been multiple problems in the SOF aircraft program which resulted 
in increased costs of over $302.6 million as of March of 1991. Of these costs, 
Congressional budget cuts were approximately $48.4 million. Changes in the program 
requiring extra effort, such as prototype testing requirements and an alternate cabin 
arrangement, resulted in $97.3 million deficit of which $66 million additional funds 
were provided. Cost increases in the Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) 
hardware and an outstanding claim from IBM resulted in an $53.6 million cost 
impact. Benefits that were not received, such as the new T55-L714 engine 
development and the auxiliary fuel tank qualification cost $19.5 million.
A development that impacted the program was the cancellation of the Army 
purchase of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. The costs associated with the 
production and qualification of the Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) and the loss of the 
development, tooling, co-production and software support resulted in over $84 
million. All the costs that were to be absorbed in the production of the V-22 now had
11
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to be absorbed into the SOF program.
The total cost of the program has expanded dramatically from $1.36 billion for 
74 helicopters to an estimated cost of at least $2.1 billion. Most of these cost 
increases are due to component and airframe costs that will be incurred are being 
reported and paid for by other Army activities (GAO, 1990). The U.S. General 
Accounting Office states that the Army will probably incur more cost to correct 
problems identified during development and operational testing and to install 
equipment that will not be available when the aircraft are fielded.
Although both acquisition programs dealt with the same basic airframe and are 
within the same general time period, the differences were substantial. The CH-47 D 
program has been considered to be always on time and within/under budget. The 
SOF Aircraft program has had budgetary problems as well as difficulties in producing 
the first prototype. In the comparison of the two programs, dissimilarities in the 
contract types and the fundamental acquisition philosophies created problems with the 
internal validity. However, the basic premise of a "good" program as delineated by 
the Packard Commission should be evident in spite of these problems.
12
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VI. RESEARCH DESIGN
Qvestiomiairsx
A Likert scale questionnaire was selected as the most appropriate instrument 
for accumulating data for this research project. After each question there was an area 
that allowed for subjective comments, reproduced in Appendix B. There were two to 
three questions for each of the six conditions for a successful acquisition as delineated 
by the Packard Commission. These questions were systematically distributed 
throughout the questionnaire to prevent the grouping of the topics. The questions 
were randomly presented in either a positive or negative manner. This ensured that 
the individuals would read each question and would not just go down the survey 
answering all positively or negatively.
The survey questionnaire was prepared after a through review of literature on 
the topic. The questions were designed to address each of the specific areas in an 
acquisition model to emulate. Dr. Gerald Evans and Dr. Charles Smith reviewed the 
questionnaire prior to the distribution. In addition, the questionnaire was pre-tested on 
two military officers in order to determine the clarity of the questions and assess the 
potential responses.
PQPtfktion.
The entire population consisted of the Program Managers for each of the two 
acquisitions and their primary staff. Since the population was relatively small, there 
was no need for sampling.
13
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Response rate.
A total of eight questionnaires were sent out. Two were sent to the Program 
Managers and six to their primary staff. All were returned, resulting in a 100% 
response rate.
14
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VII. SURVEY RESULTS 
The survey questionnaire and a tabulation of the results of each question are 
included in Appendix A. The questions are identified by two numbers. The second is 
the original number assigned when the questionnaire was sent out and the first number 
realigns the questions into category groupings. The results of the questionnaire were 
manipulated so that all the responses would be on the same scaling as to the phrasing. 
The lowest score, one, indicates that the respondent was in total agreement with the 
statement. In general, the higher the response value, the more in disagreement the 
respondent is with the question, indicating a problem with the acquisition program. 
This chapter presents the results of the survey questions as they relate to the six 
conditions for a successful acquisition in the Packard Commission report.
C lear Command Channels:
In the Packard Commission’s report, the item of clear command channels were 
explained as:
"A commercial program manager has clear responsibility for his 
program, and a short unambiguous chain of command to his chief executive 
office (CEO), group general manager, or some comparable decision maker. 
Corporate interest groups, wishing to influence program actions, must persuade 
the responsible program manager, who may accept or reject their proposals. 
Major unresolved issues are referred to the CEO, who has clear authority to 
resolve any conflicts. (Packard Commission, 1988)
Questions one through three were structured to measure the degree in which
the programs had this attribute. Question one addressed the short, unambiguous chain
15
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of command, question two addressed the clear responsibility issue, and question three 
addressed the CEO’s authority. There was some confusion as to who the CEO was in 
the two programs and so the third question was thrown out.
The quantitative data displayed in figure 3 appears to indicate that both
RESPONSE COMMAND CHANNELS
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#1 (1) #2(7) #3(13) ALL
QUESTION
Figure 3.
programs tend to be fairly equal in their responses. Although both acquisition 
programs agreed with the questions, both tended to be neutral in their responses. The 
qualitative comments revealed that there are problems in redundancy of reporting and 
the transitions into the new Army management program.
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Stability:
The second underlying feature identified by the Packard Commission’s model 
is stability. The commission describes stability as follows:
"At the outset of a commercial program, a program manager enters a 
fundamental agreement or ’contract’ with his CEO on specifics of 
performance, schedule, and cost. So long as a program manager lives by this 
contract, his CEO provides strong management support throughout the life of 
the program. This gives a program manager maximum incentive to make 
realistic estimates, and maximum support in achieving them. In turn, a CEO 
does not authorize full-scale development for a program until his board of 
directors is solidly behind it, prepared to fund the program fully and let the 
CEO run it with the agreed-to funding." (Packard Commission, 1988)
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Figure 4.
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The was a large difference in the responses in this area (Figure 4). On 
question four. This program has long term stability, and question five, This program 
has unrealistic parameters on cost, scheduling and performance, the CH-47D program 
responses agreed completely with the statements. As one respondent stated, "The CH- 
47D modernization program has always been on schedule and cost". With the SOF 
Aircraft procurement, the lack of stability seemed to be a major problem. One 
response stated that "It is a credit to (the) Program Manager it (the program) stayed 
on course at ail with the many program changes".
Limited Reporting RequLrements:
Limited reporting requirements is the third feature identified in the Packard 
Commission model. The Commission’s meaning of limited reporting requirements is 
as follows:
"A commercial program manager reports to his CEO. Typically, he 
does so on a management-by-exception basis, focusing on deviations from 
plan." (Packard Commission, 1986)
Reporting requirements seem to be a problem area for both the CH-47D and 
the SOF aircraft programs. This area also prompted negative comments from both 
programs. As stated by one respondent, "Many of the reoccurring reports convey 
information which is 90-95% historical and (is) of no value as a management tool". 
There was some confusion as to what "management by exception" meant. Because of 
this, question eight was eliminated.
18
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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
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Small, High Quality Staffs:
The fourth feature of the Packard Commission’s report is small, high quality
staffs. The commission describes these staffs as follows:
"Generally, commercial program management staffs are much smaller 
than in typical defense programs, but personnel are hand selected by the 
program manager and are of high quality. Program staff spend their time 
managing the program, not selling or defending it. " (Packard Commission, 
1986)
Over all, the CH-47D program seemed to be satisfied with the staffs that were 
assigned to the program, however, the respondents thought that the staffing was too 
small in relation to the program size. One respondent stated, "Major staff reductions
19
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STAFFING
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Figure 6.
in 1985 under ’matrix’ initiatives, but no corresponding work reduction". The 
responses concerning the quality of the people working on both programs seem high. 
A SOF Aircraft program respondent stated, "We have been very lucky with staffing. 
The mission of the aircraft motivates many", and "A small, close and very functional 
group with a wide variety of capabilities".
Communication with Users:
The fifth underlying feature defined by the Packard Commission was 
communication with users. The Commission define communication with users as
20
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follows:
”A commercial program manager establishes a dialogue with the 
customer, or user, at the conception of the program when the initial trade-offs 
are made, and maintains that communication throughout the program. 
Generally, when developmental problems arise, performance tradeoffs are 
made — with the user’s concurrence — in order to protect cost and schedule.
As a result, a program manger is motivated to seek out and address problems, 
rather than hide from them. " (Packard Commission, 1986)
COMMUNICATIONS WITH USERS
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Generally, both programs seem to be satisfied with the quality of 
communication with the end user. The comments showed that the SOF aircraft 
program had some difficulties with the end user leadership. One SOF program 
respondent said, "User leadership is not always on line, but (the) lower levels have 
direct real time involvement".
21
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Prototyping and Testing:
The last of the six underlying features that typified the most successful 
commercial programs is prototyping and testing. The Commission described 
prototyping and testing as follows:
"In commercial programs, a system (or critical subsystem) mvolving 
unproven technology is realized in prototype hardware and tested under 
simulated operational conditions before final design approval or authorization 
for production. In many cases, a program manager establishes a red team, or 
devil’s advocate, within the program office to workout pitfalls -- particularly 
those that might arise from operational problems, or from an unexpected 
response by a competitor. Prototyping, early operational testing, and red 
teaming are used in concert for the timely idendfication and correction of 
problems unforeseen at a program’s start." (Packard Commission, 1986)
There was a wide gap in the responses of the two programs. Almost all of the
responses of the CH-47D program were in total agreement as to quality and quantity
of the prototyping and testing of the program. The SOF program had problems
throughout with this issue. Comments from the SOF respondents were, "Prototypes
were built, however schedule and funding dictated concurrency with low rate initial
production", "Very limited testing. Production was blessed prior to completion of the
prototype" and, "Have prototypes, but also a very compressed schedule".
Statistical analysis:
In order to determine if the results of the questionnaire were statistically 
significant. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Independent Samples was performed on 
each of the questions. The Wilcoxon test was chosen because the data scale was
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ordinal and the problem objective was to compare two independent populations. The 
null hypothesis was that the responses from the two programs were the same. The 
alternative hypothesis was that the responses of the SOF aircraft program were 
different then that of the CH-47D program. The significance level was set at alpha of 
.10 (Keller, e ta l, 1990).
The results from the Wilcoxon test can be found in figure 7. The test revealed 
that the responses to questions 4,5,15,16, and 17 were found to be statistically 
significant. These questions related to two specific areas, stability and prototyping 
and testing. Even though only responses to five questions were found to be 
significant, almost all of the responses from The CH-47D program were lower than
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that of the SOF Aircraft program.
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VI. SUMMARY
In 1986, when President Reagan established the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management, he was looking in part for an answer to the acquisition 
dilemma. The motivation was largely due to eroding Congressional and public 
confidence in light of "overpriced spare parts, test deficiencies, and cost and schedule 
over-runs" (Packard Commission, 1986). The Packard Commission, in a section 
called "an acquisition model to emulate", identified six management features evident 
in successful commercial programs. These features were based on the analysis of a 
number of successful commercial programs. This paper has attempted to answer 
whether those features are present in two current Army acquisition programs. One 
acquisition, the Ch-47 D program, is generally considered a very successful program 
and the second, the SOF aircraft program, has been plagued by problems in cost over­
runs and program scheduling.
The survey identified two areas which were statistically significant in the 
differentiation of the two acquisition programs; stability and the use of prototyping 
and testing. Although the other areas addressed in the survey were relatively close in 
their responses, the CH-47 D program was consistently more in agreement with the 
Packard Commision Report than that of the SOF aircraft program. This consistency 
of responses would tend to support the assumption that the areas identified in the 
Packard Commission’s report are present in successful programs, even though the 
responses to these questions were not statistically significant.
In the area of stability, there was a large divergence in the responses of the
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two programs. For the question "This program has long term stability", all 
respondents from the CH-47 D model program stated they totally agreed with the 
statement (average of I) while the SOF aircraft program respondents tended to be 
neutral (average of 3.75). In response to the second stability question, "This program 
has realistic parameters on cost, scheduling and performance", the CH-47 D program 
respondents again totally agreed with the statement while the SOF program 
respondents disagreed (average of 5). While the responses to the last question in the 
area of stability, "Funding has not been a problem due to changes in the program", 
were not statistically significant, there still was a wide gap in the responses in the two 
programs. Most defense programs probably feel the pinch of funding problems and 
relate them to changes in their program. As one CH-47D program respondent stated 
"Lack o f funding is the root o f all evil”.
The responses by the SOF aircraft program in the area of stability are not 
surprising due to the large numbers of changes in the program itself and the impact of 
the loss of the V-22 Tilt-rotor program. The initial philosophy that the SOF program 
would be non-developmental, and the urgency in which the aircraft were needed, 
impacted dramatically on the long term stability of the program. Since the Air Force 
was losing the special forces mission, the Department of the Defense planners were in 
essence, trying to speed the developmental process. With the realization that the 
requirements of the aircraft systems were expanding and the increased 
risk involved in the process, there was going to be a need for 
developmental and operational testing. This additional testing
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operational testing. This additional testing strained the long term stability of the SOF 
program.
Stability has long been known as serious defense acquisition problem in both 
the commercial and government sectors. In 1983, the Air Force Systems Command 
investigated ways to shorten the acquisition process and procure weapons at a lower 
cost. The study reviewed the cost and scheduling histories of 109 acquisition 
programs and concluded that "program instability is the major causative factor o f cost 
and schedule growth” (Air Force System Command, 1983). Frank Carlucci, former 
Defense Secretary, once stated that "We all know what is fundamentalty wrong with 
the acquisition system, time and again instability has been scored as its most chronic 
defect” (F. C. Carlucci, 1988). David Packard, the head of the Presidents Blue 
Ribbon Commission stated that "Without stability, no permanent acquisition 
improvements are possible” (U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1986).
Prototyping and testing proved to be another area in which the programs were 
significantly different. The first question in this area, "This system was proven using 
prototyping of the hardware", showed that the CH-47 D program was in total 
agreement with the statement while the SOF program tended to be more neutral in its 
response. The next two questions dealt with testing the system’s design under 
simulated operational conditions and the timely identification of problems using testing 
and prototyping. Both questions showed a wide disparity between the two programs 
in that the CH-47 D program responses were almost in total agreement with aU the 
questions in this section, while the SOF Aircraft program responses were, on average,
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the highest for the entire questionnaire.
The questions on prototyping and testing prompted responses indicative of the 
problems experienced by the SOF aircraft program. One respondent stated they had 
"very limited testing. Production was blessed prior to completion o f the prototype. " 
and ” Prototypes were built, however scheduling and funding dictated concurrency with 
low rate production”.
The main problem with the SOF aircraft program is derived from the initial 
thought that the SOF aircraft would be a non-developmental item and would require 
no developmental or operational testing. Since the risk of the program was 
determined to be large (GAO, 1990), the testing process was added after the 
acquisition process had begun. The high risks that the General Accounting Office 
identified as inherent to the SOF aircraft program included fielding systems requiring 
expensive retrofits and providing aircraft that would be unable to perform their 
required mission.
In this project, there were some limitations as to the internal validity of the 
results. The two programs, although they both dealt with similar aircraft, were of 
different contract types. The acquisitions were also different in respect to the 
procurement time frame and the criticality of the mission aircraft. The surveyed 
population was limited in size, but was substantial enough to perform the Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum Test for Independent Samples. In light of these problems, there can be 
drawn some valid conclusions concerning these two programs. First, the Packard 
Commission’s six underlying features of a successful acquisition program are evident
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in what is generally considered as a timely, cost effective program. Secondly, 
instability and the lack of prototyping and testing were major factors in the 
degradation of the procurement process in the SOF aircraft program.
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
Title/Position ;____________________________________________________Yearaviththe
program;  Mil/Civ_____
QUESTIONNAIRE:
Please answer the question by indicating whether you agree or disagree by marking an 
X along the scale. Provide any comments in the area provided.
1. This program has a short, unambiguous chain of command.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6 —7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
2. This program has long term stability.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5—"—6 —7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
3. There have been extensive reporting requirements.
AGREE 1-----2— “3—-—4——5-----6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
4. The staffing for this program has been excessive.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
5. The program staff has had poor communication with the end user.
AGREE I 2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.
6. The system was proven using prototyping of the hardware.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6—-—7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
7. The Program Manager has clear responsibility for the program.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4——5----6 7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
8. This program has unrealistic parameters on cost, scheduling and performance.
AGREE 1—-—2——3----- 4---- 5-— 6---- 7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
9. Reporting is accomplished by a "Management by exception principle.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
10. Personnel involved with this program are of the highest calibre.
AGREE 1——2-----3— -4-----5-----6“~—7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
11. All developmental problems and performance tradeoffs were made without the users’ 
concurrence.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5----- 6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
33
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.
12. The system’s design was tested under simulated operational conditions before final 
design approval or production authorization.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4-----5----- 6 7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
13. The Chief Executives Office does not have clear authority to resolve any conflicts.
AGREE 1—~—2~— 3““ —4-----5-----6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
14. Funding has been a problem due to changes in the program.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-- --5——̂ -——7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
15. The program staff spends most of their time managing the program, not "selling of 
defending" it.
AGREE 1—" 2 ““—-3——4—" 5 ““—6~~—7 DISAGREE 
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
16. Quality communication with the end user has been inconsistent throughout the 
program.
AGREE 1 -2“~”"3~~—"4-----5--~“~6””""7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
17. Prototyping and operational testing were used together for timely identification and 
correction of problems that were unforeseen at the programs start.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.
Please answer the following questions:
A) What were the major accomplishments of the program?
b) What were the major problems with the program?
Thank you for your time and effort with this project. If you have any questions, please 
contact me at (406) 251-2793
John M. Wilson 
CPT, AV
SURVEY RESULTS:
SOF Aircraft Modification:
Original Adjusted
Number NuipbeJE
Clear Command Channels.
Memgs
1 1 4 1 5 2 3
7 2 3 
Stability.
1 3 1 2
13 3 0 0 0 0 0
2 4 5 2 5 3 3.75
8 5 6 
Limited Reporting Requirements.
7 5 2 7.75
14 6 6 7 6 4 5.75
3 7 4 7 5 4 5
9 8 0 
Small, High Quality Staffs.
0 0 0 0
4 9 1 7 1 3 3
10 10 2
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.
15 11 2 1 2 4 2.25
Communication with Users. 
5 12 2 1 5 2 2.5
11 13 2 1 2 1 1.5
16 14 2 1 4 1 2
Prototyping and Testing.
6 15 3 3 3 4 3.25
12 16 3 6 2 7 4.5
17 17 6 5 5 6 5.5
D Modifications:
Clear Command Channels.
1 1 7 1 1 4 3.25
7 2 3 1 3 1 2
Stability.
13 3 0 0 0 0 0
2 4 1 1 1 1 1
8 5 1 1 1 1 1
Limited Reporting Requirements
14 6 1 5 1 4 1.75
3 7 4 2 7 4 4.75
9 8 0 0 0 0 0
Small, High Quality Staffs.
4 9 1 1 1 1 1
10 10 3 1 2 3 2.25
15 11 1 3 2 1 1.66
Communication with Users. 
5 12 2 2 1 1 1.5
11 13 4 2 1 1 2
16 14 2 2 1 1 1.5
Prototyping and Testing.
6 15 1 1 1 1 1
12 16 2 2 1 1 1.5
17 17 2 1 1 3 1.75
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APPENDIX B Questionnaire comments.
The numbers in the parenthesis are the original order that they were asked. The 
questions have been realign into the six areas as described by the Packard 
Commission.
Clear Command Channels.
1.(1) This program has a short, unambiguous chain of command.
CH-47 D modification:
* The Logistic s division reports through both AVSCOM and PEO. At times 
this redundant effort causes priority issues to be put on hold.
* Everyone is in charge and therefore no one is!
SOF Aircraft:
* Transition from the Army to SOCOM management has not been trouble free. 
Army still wants a hand in management.
2.(7) The program manager has clear responsibility for the 
program.
CH-47 D modification:
* AMC has not relinquished one iota of responsibility to PEO structure.
* Overall responsibility are clear. With regards to sustainment/readiness, we 
are in a state of confusion.
SOF Aircraft:
* None
3.(13) Thrown out.
Stability.
4.(2) This program has long term stability.
CH-47 D modification:
* The CH-47D modernization program has always been on schedule and cost.
* Attribute to multiyear procurement.
SOF Aircraft:
* Within a low density aircraft fleet.
* It is a credit to (the) PM it has stayed on course at all with the many 
program changes.
5.(8) This program has unrealistic parameters on cost, scheduling and performance. 
CH-47 D modification:
* The basic CH-47D program has realistic parameters.
SOF Aircraft:
* Had it been properly staffed from the start, the goals would have been more 
realistic.
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APPENDIX B. Questionnaire Comments.
6.(14) Funding has been a problem due to changes in the program.
CH-47 D modification:
* The basic program has remained stable. We have funding shortfalls mainly 
due to ECP’s to better serve the user. We also have funding issue due to Operation 
Desert Storm.
* All solvent programs experienced pressure to fund unprogrammed 
requirements to support Desert Storm.
* Lack of funding is the root of all evil.
SOF Aircraft:
* No comments.
Limited Reporting Requirements.
7.(3) There have been extensive reporting requirements.
CH-47 D modification:
* Many of the recurring reports convey information which is 90-95% historical 
and is of no value as a management tool.
* Many reports should be combined.
SOF Aircraft:
* SOCOM not sure yet what they want.
* There have been extensive historical/back briefings/ 
updating matrix support people.
8.(9) Thrown out.
Small, High Quality staffs.
9.(4) The staffing for this program is excessive.
CH-47 D modification:
* Overall program staffing has been adequate. We need authority to more (sic) 
personnel as required due to program changes.
* Major staff reductions in 1985 under "matrix" initiatives, but no 
corresponding work reductions.
* I have reduced staffing by 25% in four years.
SOF Aircraft:
* No comments.
10.(10) Personnel involved with this program is of the highest calibre.
ÇH-47 D modification:
* I believe persoimel involved with the CH-47D program is well above 
average.
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APPENDIX B. Questionnaire Comments.
SOF Aircraft:
* We have been very lucky with staffing. The mission of the aircraft 
motivates many.
* A small, close and very functional group with a wide variety of capabilities.
11.(15) The program staff spends most of their time managing the program, not 
selling or defending it.
CH-47 D modification:
* The program sold itself.
SOF Aircraft:
* Lot of time spent selling and defending the program.
Communication With Users.
12.(50) The program staff has poor communication with the user.
CH-47 D modification:
* We have great communication with the user.
SOF Aircraft:
* User leadership is not always on line, but lower level has direct real time 
involvement.
13.(11) All developmental problems and performance tradeoffs were made without 
the users’ concurrence.
CH-47 D
* Those that affected the REC were coordinated.
* The user participated as a member of the CH-47D development team.
SOF Aircraft:
14.(16) Quality communication with the end user has been inconsistent throughout 
the program.
CH-47 D modification:
* Strongly disagree.
SOF Aircraft:
* Good communication
Prototyping and Testing.
15.(6) This system was proven using prototyping of the hardware.
CH-47 D modification:
* Three prototype aircraft had full D.T./O.T. tests and demonstrated REC 
requirements.
* Three prototypes tested for over three years plus accel. svs. life aircraft
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tested for ten years during production.
SOF Aircraft:
* NDI off the shelf modifications with excessive integration.
* Have prototypes but also a very compressed schedule.
* Prototypes were built, however schedule and funding dictated concurrency 
with low rate production.
16.(12) The system’s design was tested under simulated operational conditions before 
final design approval or production authorization.
CH-47 D modification:
* Done as required.
SOF Aircraft:
* The modification package was considered "off the shelf" to an 
existing/proven package.
* Very limited testing. Production was blessed prior to completion of the 
prototype.
17.(17) Prototyping and operational testing were used together for timely 
identification and correction of problems that were unforeseen at the programs start. 
CH-47 D modification:
* The prototyping and operational tests were separate programs, however both 
were used to identify and correct problems.
SOF Aircraft:
* Operational testing was part of the program based on MS O/I MARB.
M ajor accomplishments.
CH-47 D modification:
* Always below costs. Always within 60 days of schedule (off only during 
groundings). It meets all requirements.
* Program has been executed within cost and schedule.
* The CH-47 modernization program is a total success. We are in the 10th 
year of production and remain on schedule and cost. We have also successfully 
fielded the active Army with 95% availability of ASL/PLL and special tools.
* On time, on cost, exceeding all technical and performance requirements 
specified by the user.
SOF Aircraft:
* Provided unique aircraft for special operations. First truly integrated cockpit 
for helicopters.
* In spite of funding and service fighting, the prototypes are flying.
* In spite of program dynamics and budget cuts we teve managed to keep the
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program on track and viable. We are now actually on the verge of awarding 
production contracts.
* Completion of prototypes, technical testing and obtaining a fully funded 
program.
M ajor Problem s.
CH-47 D modification:
* Cost, ie, more system should have been modernized (cockpit,rotorhead, ect.) 
but only so many dollars were available for development/production.
* During 1989, after the loss of an aircraft, a joint technical review team 
recommended several improvements to the airframe and quality (on track an Boeing).
* Program delivery ends October 1993. This, plus other business base 
reductions have caused a shift of key contractor personnel to commercial and higher 
visibility military programs, result is reduced levels and timeliness of contractor 
management support.
* Spares support at initial fielding and very large technical issues discovered 
five years into production.
SOF Aircraft:
* Gain matrix, operational/technical tester support. Getting AAA to 
understand the program.
* Having to live with all the problems a compressed schedule creates and die 
reliance on benefits from other programs that did not materialize.
* Impacts of changes in the military industrial base. Contractors hidden 
agendas and lack of urgency.
* Funding cuts and diversions.
41
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
